Wild Guesses

Someone asked me why the North seemed so out-generaled during the Civil War. That’s something that has confounded expert historians since April 1865. A lack of credentials never stopped me yet so here goes.

We must understand that, unlike the common wisdom states, the Civil War was unique in that the losers pretty much wrote the history, at least for a hundred years. Since Virginians largely led the effort, the southern generals were elevated into some mythical status normally reserved for near-gods or superhuman heroes. Lee’s mistakes faded into obscurity while competence on the other side faded into the same vast maw of neglected history.

George Mean decisively defeated Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. For this affront, he never received credit, was largely despised, and is mainly remembered for failing to raising a battered army that had just participated, for three long days, in some of the most savage fighting of the war, and rolling over all the dead bodies to take after a still intact army under highly competent commanders. It didn't help that Meade was not a particularly likable person.

Overall, I think that the trend in Civil War campaigns favored the defensive side, especially when those battles took place on one side’s familiar ground. Meade enjoyed well displaced defensive and familiar positions at Gettysburg much as Lee had at Fredericksburg and the later Virginia campaigns.

We must also realize that generals are only as effective as the troops they lead are trained and ready. The south, it seems to me, was much more motivated throughout the war. We can see from modern examples how a people can be motivated when they think their social order is being threatened.

The commander of Union Forces before Grant was Henry Halleck, a remnant known as "Old Brains." He performed faithfully, but cautiously and festered at the success of subordinates, particularly U.S. Grant. 

There is no doubt that a great number of highly skilled and trained officers chose to fight for the South in April 1861. That included West Point graduates and veterans of the invasion of Mexico. That left the North with many political generals like Dan Sickles who almost cost Meade victory. Of course, the South suffered this to a degree. The left flank of the southern line in the assault on Cemetery Ridge ended up being a brigade commanded by Jefferson Davis’s nephew, a former attorney.

There are individual cases that could be studied. Some think there was ample evidence that George McClellan would have settled for two countries, as long as he could have presided over one of them. It is possible that this motivation caused his reluctance for battle. Some of Meade’s generals were supporters of Joseph Hooker, whom Meade replaced.

Internal political struggles may have hampered the armies of North more than the South. General Grant, for example, never trusted General George Thomas, a Virginian who stayed with the Union and who some believe was the best general on either side of the conflict. I’m sure there were many generals in the Army of the Potomac who never trusted Grant.

There is the matter of luck, but both sides seemed to fare equally in this respect.

There is also, I believe, the question of individual maniacy. We can go to the modern Middle East to see the effectiveness of armies composed of men bearing systemic hatred who join wars to avoid a harsh life with the belief that, upon a final sacrifice, they will ascend immediately into Paradise.

I’ll close with the question of collective manic obsession. Any observer should have known after July 3, 1863, that the South would never win that war, nor would they be recognized by England as a nation. Lee and Davis chose to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of Americans rather than admit that reality. That is a lesson we should take under consideration even unto this day.

In closing, as the combatant said in North Dallas Forty, “What could have happened did happen."