Traversing the Narrows

 In seeking a temporary working definition of evil, let us first say that it is an act of humankind, to be distinguished from the mysterious workings of a spirit, a phenomenon, or a god. As an act, it must be planned and enacted by a person or persons. As an act, it must be planned and executed against a person or persons. As an act, it must deprive a person or persons of the ability to continue life in a state of well-being, safety, and opportunity. Finally, as an act, it must involve intent.

Accepting these for the present, questions arise immediately. If we accept the fact that evil thrives from the actions of a prime agent, say an Adolph Hitler, are there attendant gradations?

Are those who support the actions of the prime agent themselves the doers of evil? This becomes cloudy if the support falls within the acts of nationalism. It can lead to what we might call the Nuremburg Defense.” As mentioned earlier Adolph Eichmann used it later after being captured by Israeli agents and put on trial in Jerusalem for his role in the murder of millions of Jews and other innocents. As a primary functionary in the Holocaust, he claimed that he was “only following orders.” His performance during the trial prompted writer Hannah Eichmann to observe:

“The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together.”[i]

Are seemingly normal people who are drawn into evil acts under the spell of a charismatic leader guilty of the evil acts resulting from the following of orders? This question becomes a complex one when we consider orders that aren’t given directly. Instead, they may be implanted by nefarious sources and strengthened by repetition until the irrational among us assume that they are called to an almost divine directive. The resulting rampaging mob may not represent “some fine people” but it does contain, among its throbbing mass, some who we had once considered “terribly and terrifyingly normal.”

Speaking of following orders, at least one religious figurehead ordained that we do not judge others in order that we, ourselves, might not be judged.[ii] If we are to understand the nature of evil at all, however, we must resolve the question of “moral obedience,” a possible one-time act that resulted from achieving a stated end. Standing in opposition to this is the Kantian concept of “moral imperative,” or conduct that is absolute and not dependent upon any desire or end.[iii] Further, though not widely researched, evidence exists that German soldiers who refused a part in the murder of the innocents were not punished but simply reassigned.[iv]

There, at the end of the day’s cruise, we must, I think, abandon the obedience, or Nuremburg, defense. The ashes of the innocent that still cover the fields of Europe demand it of us.

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[i] Arendt, Hannah, op cit

[ii] Matthew 7:1 NIV

[iii] Kant, I., & Beck, L. W. (1956). Critique of practical reason. New York: Liberal Arts Press.

[iv] Goldhagen, D. J. (1996). Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: Knopf.